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ABSTRACT 
While there is an extensive history of neuroscience, only recently has the theory and the 
methods of this discipline been applied to answer questions about decision making, choice, 
preference, risk and happiness. This new area of research, coined neuroeconomics, seeks to 
reveal more about the neural functioning and associated implications for economic and consumer 
behavior. In this paper are some of the key developments in neuroeconomics research as they 
relate to consumer decision-making, culminating with a discussion of possible future research 
areas in marketing where this type of research could be applied with important managerial, 
policy and academic implications.  
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This paper is a review of some of the key developments in a new area of research called 
neuroeconomics which combines methods and theory from economics, psychology and 
neuroscience. Neuroeconomics research examines how people make choices and attempts to 
determine the underlying neural basis for these choices and decisions. Until now, there has been 
very little integration of this new approach with current behavioral marketing research. This 
review will examine some of the seminal studies in neuroeconomics as it relates to consumer 
decision-making and offer future research areas in marketing where this type of research could 
be applied. 
 
WHAT NEUROSCIENCE CAN REVEAL ABOUT CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING 
Decision-making is a fundamental part of human behavior. We all make decisions 
everyday that influence our health, well-being, finances, and future prospects among other 
things. Researchers have become increasingly interested in why we make the decisions we do, 
especially when in many cases these decisions do not appear rational or to benefit us in the long 
run. While neoclassical economics has traditionally looked at how people should behave, other 
disciplines, such as psychology and cognitive science, have tried to answer the question of why 
people act the way they do. A new discipline, referred to by some as neuroeconomics, has sought 
to meld theory and methodology from diverse areas such as economics, psychology, 
neuroscience, cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, mathematics, statistics, behavioral 
finance and decision theory in order to create a model of human behavior that not only explains 
but also predicts how people make decisions (Glimcher and Rustichini 2004). 
Decision theory integrates mathematics, statistics, economics, philosophy, management, 
and psychology to better understand how decisions such as choices between incommensurable 
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commodities, choice under uncertainty, intertemporal choice, and social choice are made. It has 
been assumed in decision theory that agents respond rationally in forming their choices and 
preferences. Essentially, consumers should follow a utility maximization function: 
)(max),( xumpv =  (p1,p2, …, pn) * (x1, x2,…, xn) = m 
such that  .mpx =
The function gives the maximum utility achievable at a given level of prices (p) and 
income (m), and a utility maximizing bundle x* meets the budget constraint of the consumer 
with equality (Varian 1978). Expected Utility Theory states:  
),( mpv







This theory finds that any “normal” preference relation over a finite set of states can be 
expressed as an expected utility equation.  
However, the introduction of prospect theory, which suggests the possibility that other 
factors may impact behavioral decision-making for the individual, has generated an interest in 
understanding the underlying mechanisms of preference, judgment, and choice (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). The significance of these findings can have important implications for the 
marketing discipline. To understand the critical drivers of consumer behavior, a better 
understanding of the decision-making processes used by consumers is important. 
Psychology has sought to investigate the “black box” of the human mind (Camerer et al. 
2003). Cognitive psychology, and more recently cognitive neuroscience, has introduced new 
tools that allow researchers to capture and measure data from brain activity related to a specific 
function and behavior. This new type of data has created new directions of research that combine 
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neuroscience, psychology, and decision theory to better understand the complexities of human 
decision-making. 
Neuroscience looks at the structure, function and development of the nervous system and 
brain, while cognitive neuroscience studies how behavior and the nervous system work together 
in humans and animals. In other words, cognitive neuroscience is the study of the neural 
mechanisms of cognition (Gazzaniga 2002). At the nexus of neuroscience, economics and 
psychology, there is an area that has tentatively been coined neuroeconomics which uses 
neuroscience techniques to look specifically at how human subjects make choices. 
Neuroeconomics is not only interested in exposing brain regions associated with specific 
behavior, but also in identifying neural circuits or systems of specialized regions which control 
choice, preference, and judgment (Camerer et al. 2003) 
One such technique borrowed from neuroscience is functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) which may reveal how humans and animals use the neural substrates of the 
brain to process and evaluate decisions, weigh risk and reward, and learn to trust others in 
transactions. Brain imaging techniques that can be used on human subjects include: 
(INSERT TABLE 1) 
Another technique borrowed from neuroscience is transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) which is used to produce a magnetic pulse that can temporarily interfere with normal 
brain activity. For example, TMS can produce sudden movements in motor areas. While it has 
not yet been used for neuroeconomic studies, TMS has been used successfully for cognitive 
neuroscience studies and could potentially be used in the future to study decision-making. In 
addition, there are invasive techniques of monitoring brain activity in animals including single 
cell recording, where an electrode is passed through the skull into the brain. Neuroeconomics 
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studies can also use non-imaging techniques. For example, some studies have been conducted 
using patients with brain lesions. Additionally, in order to determine central nervous system 
(CNS) response, studies can measure hormone levels, galvanic skin response, sweat gland 
activity and heart rate (Carter and Tiffany 1999; Frackowiak et al. 2004). 
Before imaging technology made it possible to examine the “black box” of cognition, 
much of economic theory relied on the rational choice model. Current models of decision-
making only partially explain human behavior. Neuroeconomics examines higher level cognitive 
functions of personal choice and decision-making, demonstrating how these are expressed at the 
neuronal and biochemical level. The analysis of this newest form of data which more closely 
examines brain processing hopes to bring us closer to answering questions as to why people 
consume, have addictions, save and hoard, in addition to understanding what makes people 
happy, risk seeking or adverse, trusting or trustworthy, and what drives preference and choice. 
 
The Evolution of Neuroscience and Behavioral Decision-making 
 Over the past 50 years, scientists have experimented with a number of hypothetical game 
scenarios in order to determine models of how people make choices in economic situations. 
Before imaging technology, it was not possible to accurately investigate the influence of 
emotions and cognition on these economic models of decision-making. However, behavioral 
economists have begun to challenge the assumptions of the rational agent and have found that 
psychological and emotional factors do indeed play an important role in people’s economic 
decision-making process. Essentially, neuroeconomics looks at two branches of choice: solitary 
choice and strategic choice (Zak 2004). 
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In their paper on neuroeconomics, Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec argued for the 
fundamental insights that neuroscience could offer economics (Camerer et al. 2003). They argue 
that economic theory has assumed that agents can ‘mentalize’, or infer from the actions of others, 
what their preferences and beliefs are. However, accumulating evidence from individuals with 
autism, Asperger’s syndrome, and brain lesions shows that mentalizing is a specialized skill 
modularized in specific brain regions. More importantly, the ability to mentalize exists in 
varying degrees from person to person (Camerer et al. 2003).  
 Traditional economic theory has maintained that humans are rational decision-making 
entities, that each individual has a clear sense of his/her own preferences and try to maximize 
his/her own well being and make consistent choices over time (Huang 2005). However, this 
model is more often violated than upheld as people and animals attempt to outwit evolution and 
destiny. Neuroscience gives researchers the opportunity to look into the ‘black box” of cognitive 
processing to reveal empirical indications of how the brain really processes choice, risk and 
preferences. The goal is to create “a complete neuroeconomic theory of the brain” (Glimcher 
2003). 
 
The Neuroscience of Game Playing 
Games give neuroeconomists a useful way to isolate decision and choice variables in 
experimental studies. Most of these studies look at either behavior, autonomic reactions (such as 
hormone levels or heart rate) or brain activity while subjects are engaged in strategic games, thus 
revealing how the neuronal system processes fairness, reward, loss, trust, distrust, revenge, 
discounting and choice. Specific brain regions have been implicated in how judgments are made 
about perceptual stimuli received from our environment (Adolphs 2003). Some of these brain 
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regions involved in judgment include the amygdala, which is central in the processing and 
memory of emotions, the insula, believed to be involved with feelings of disgust and unease, and 
the anterior cingulate cortex, which is implicated in reward anticipation, decision-making and 
empathy, among other important regions (Frackowiak et al. 2004) (see Appendix A and B).  
 
Neural Calculations of Decisions 
The idea that people seem prone to violate expected utility theory has led to the 
development of alternative models on how choices are made under risk. One of these 
alternatives, prospect theory, exhibits a series of effects that alter the value assigned to gains and 
losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Phenomena such as the certainty effect, which states that 
people are prone to underweight probable versus certain outcomes, or the isolation effect which 
finds inconsistent preferences for identical outcomes based on how the outcomes are framed, or 
anchoring, biases and correlation illusion effects challenge the notion that utility theory holds in 
real life cases of human judgment (Kahneman and Tversky 1982).  
Interestingly, Camerer makes clear in his paper on neuroeconomics that all the violations 
of the utility theory that humans commit have been replicated in animal studies (Camerer et al. 
2003). For example, rats have also committed that same patterned violations in addition to other 
expected utility properties (Kagel et al. 1995). 
Probability is how animals and humans calculate associations between events and predict 
outcomes critical to survival and understanding their environment. One study found evidence 
that dopamine neurons of the primate ventral midbrain may act to predict reward by specifically 
coding errors (Fiorillo et al. 2003). It was found that dopamine levels increase during gambling, 
which indicates that uncertainty may be the mechanism that induces this dopamine rush. It is 
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hypothesized that this may explain the reward people feel when gambling, which cannot be 
explained by the monetary gain of gambling since losses usually outnumber gains. This 
uncertainty induced increase in dopamine may act to reinforce risk taking behavior, while the 
phasic response after predication error may serve to mediate the reward reinforcement itself. 
Gold and Shadlen (2002) build a relationship between the theoretical framework developed by 
codebreakers during World War II and how decisions are computing in the brain. They 
hypothesize that decisions are reached when evidence reaches a threshold value, this value being 
controlled by neural circuits that calculating the rate of reward (Gold and Shadlen 2002). 
 
Trust and Cooperation 
Imaging studies have revealed more about how social interaction shapes neural response, 
allowing us to choose mutual cooperation and shared gains over self interested choices to create 
a sense of stability in longer term game scenarios (McCabe et al. 2001). Increased activity in 
players who were more trusting and cooperative was shown in Brodmann area 10 (believed to be 
the locus of mentalizing) and in the limbic system, where emotions are believed to be processed 
(Camerer et al. 2003). 
One study used the trust game to demonstrate how the brain processes decisions that 
involve cooperation and trust. Using the trust game, McCabe, et al. (2003b) found that subjects 
who were receivers violated the rational response which would be to accept any amount of 
money offered to them by the givers. Interestingly, when a similarly low offer was offered by a 
computer player instead of a human, the response in the receivers was not as extreme (McCabe 
2003b). Half of the subjects in the study could be characterized as cooperators and had a 
common pattern of divergent activation in the prefrontal cortex where simultaneous attention to 
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mutual gains and inhibition of immediate gratification allow for cooperative choices. The social 
brain hypothesis says that brain growth is due to adaptation caused by increasingly sophisticated 
social interaction. 
 Another version of the trust game found that in a multi-round game, the reciprocity of 
one player was a strong predictor of trusting behavior in future rounds from the other player 
(King-Casas et al. 2005). This study sought to understand how trust is developed over multiple 
rounds and over time, which is based in the concept of reciprocity. Specifically, reciprocity was 
defined as “a fractional change in money sent across rounds by one player in response to a 
fractional change in money sent by their partner. By scanning both participants simultaneously, 
an analysis of both within and between brain differences was able to show two differing neural 
responses. One was encoded by response magnitude, which was correlated with “intention to 
trust” on the next round of play and the other was encoded by response timing, which shifted by 
14 seconds as the reputation of the player developed. Neural response was found in the dorsal 
striatum, the head of the caudate nucleus located in the basal ganglia (Purves et al. 1997). The 
researchers proposed that the caudate nucleus may be the area that received and computed 
information about the fairness of the other player’s actions and the intention to reciprocate the 
action with trust. This may be similar to shifts in the reward prediction error signals in 
reinforcement learning.   
In a similar study, fMRI scans found that the when responders were offered low amounts 
($1 or $2 out of $10 possible) there was more activation in the prefrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate (ACC) and the insula cortex (Sanfey et al. 2003). When monetary offers were low, the 
receivers had increased activity in the insula, which is often associated with feelings of pain and 
disgust (Wright et al. 2004). The ACC receives input from a number of other areas and is 
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thought to resolve conflict among these areas. A player refusing an offer could be predicted by 
the level of activation in the insula. The author speculates that the insula may be the neural area 
responsible for distaste for inequality or unfair conditions. This has also been posited by social 
utility models which have attempted to explain ultimatum rejections, public goods contributions 
and trust, and gift exchange results. 
Zak and his colleagues looked at the hormonal response during trust games to determine 
if there was a specific hormone that could be connected to feelings of trust and distrust (Zak et 
al. 2005; Zak et al. 2004). Using the trust game, subjects’ blood was tested after each round for 
levels of oxytocin (OT), which has been associated in facilitating social behaviors, social 
recognition, maternal attachment, pair bonding, and the feeling of falling in love. The study 
found that when money was returned to the first player, OT did indeed increase to twice the 
levels of the random draw. This means that if people felt they were being trusted, increased OT 
levels made them more likely to trust back. Interestingly, ovulating women were less likely than 
non ovulating women or men to give money back even if they received the full amount from the 
other player. This, Zak believes, is due to the fact that progesterone, which increases during 
ovulation, binds with OT to inhibit its affect. In looking at distrust, Zak looked at 
dihydrotestosterone (DHT) and testosterone in both men and women to see if levels increased 
during low trust games. The study found that testosterone did not significantly increase in either 
women or men and DHT levels did not increase for women. However, there was a significant 
increase in the level of DHT in men when the other player signaled distrust. Zak hypothesizes 
that this may be related to the increased feelings of aggression that men reported when engaged 
in a low trust game. 
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In a further study, Zak worked with researchers in Switzerland to test whether trust levels 
could be manipulated with the administration of oxytocin in subjects (Kosfeld et al. 2005). The 
experimenters used the trust game, where subjects were paired as investor and trustee, and the 
investor could send the trustee as much of the original endowment which was tripled once the 
trustee received it. The trustee had the choice of keeping the full amount or any subset, or 
sending the full amount back to the investor for another round of investment. The subjects were 
given a nasal spray of the neuropeptide oxytocin prior to the initiation of the game. The study 
found that the oxytocin increased the trust behavior in the investor demonstrated in the larger 
amounts invested, but did not affect the trustworthiness of the trustee. It was hypothesized that 
while oxytocin modulates trusting behavior in humans by possibly increasing approach behavior, 
the mechanism that underlies trustworthiness or reciprocity is a different one and possibly not 
susceptible to the effects of oxytocin, which has also been found in animal studies. 
 McCabe hypothesizes that a theory of mind module allows subjects to imagine the mind 
set of another and may increase trusting behavior among agents. Because there is attention 
placed on the mutual gains, this may in turn activate the executive systems located in the frontal 
lobes that inhibit the impulse for immediate gratification and facilitate cooperation (McCabe 
2003b). 
While cooperation is an important component in human society, the desire to punish is 
the flip side of cooperation which may be how society is able to enforce social norms. An 
interesting study that looked at the neural basis for altruistic punishment or revenge found that 
people feel satisfaction from punishing violations of societal norms (de Quervain et al. 2004). 
Using PET scans, researchers found greater activation in the dorsal striatum which is usually 
“implicated in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions.” In 
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addition, those subjects with stronger responses in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur 
greater costs in order to punish the violators. 
 
Fairness 
Humans tend to reject inequality even if it means walking away from a reward, which 
does not seem to indicate a rational agent in all situations (Powell 2003). In a study that looked at 
the neural substrates of cognitive and emotional processing, specifically fairness and unfairness 
activated during the Ultimatum Game, 19 subjects were scanned using fMRI (Sanfey et al. 
2003). The Ultimatum Game is based on one player offering the other a split of a sum of money 
which the responder can either reject or accept. Players were paired with others who offered 
various split amounts of $10. The responders were scanned as they decided whether they would 
choose fair or unfair proposals. Previous behavioral research on the Ultimatum Game found that 
low offers are rejected 50% of the time even though a rational maximizing solution would be for 
the responder to accept any amount of money, since some money should be better than no 
money. Subjects usually report that low offers are often rejected because it provokes an angry 
response. In Sanfey, et al.’s study, brain imaging revealed that unfair offers activated the bilateral 
anterior insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).  The 
anterior insula is often implicated in negative emotional responses, more specifically in disgust 
(Krolak-Salmon et al. 2002; Wright et al. 2004). The DLPFC is often implicated in executive 
function and goal maintenance, which may stem from the responder actively maintaining the 
cognitive goal of acquiring as much money as possible. Increased activation of the insula was 
biased toward rejection of the offer and increased activation of the DLPFC was biased to 
accepting the offer. ACC has been implicated in cognitive conflict and may be a result of conflict 
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between emotional and goal motivation during the game. Interestingly, the experiment was also 
run with both human and computer partners who acted in offering the split. The response in these 
brain areas was stronger when unfair offers were made by the human partner versus the 
computer, suggesting that the response was not just to the monetary amount offered, but also to 
the contextual factor that the unfair offer was made by another human. 
Even monkeys seem to adhere to this notion of fairness. Brosnan and de Waal found that 
cooperation may have developed through evolution where individuals must compare their own 
efforts to the payoff they receive with those of others (Brosnan and De Waal 2003). Brown 
capuchin monkeys responded negatively when offered unequal rewards from experimenters and 
even refused to participate when they witnessed other monkeys receiving more attractive rewards 
for the same amount of effort. The researchers posit that this inequity aversion may have an 
evolutionary origin in our neurological development. 
 
The Neural Substrates of Reward and Loss 
 Kahneman and Tversky found that loss is judged by people as being more painful than an 
equivalent gain is pleasurable as is evidenced in the convex utility curve for losses and concave 
utility curve for gains in the value function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
How valuation of gain and loss is calculated in the brain is an area under investigation by 
neuroscientists. Montague and Berns have looked at a number of experiments to develop a 
computational model, the predictor-valuation model (PGM) which anticipates a class of single-
unit neural responses in the orbitofrontal and striatal neurons (Montague and Berns 2002). Other 
brain imaging studies have found that the brain processes gains and losses differently (Smith et 
al. 2002). PET imaging has revealed that there are two separate but functionally integrated 
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choice systems, both in anatomical structure and in processing, each sensitive to loss. The 
dorsomedial system processes loss when deliberating risky gambles. When subjects make a 
choice that results in loss, there is a greater use of the dorsomedial system which serves to 
calculate versus the visceral representations in the more primitive ventromedial system which 
animals most likely use to make decisions. Choice processing seems to be centered in the more 
medial structures with more ventral than dorsal distribution. 
Another animal study looking at reward valuation has found that reward valuation in 
monkeys can be predicted in a simple model based on reward history that duplicates foraging 
behavior. Sugrue, Corrado and Newsome found that neurons in the parietal cortex represent the 
relative value of competing actions (Sugrue et al. 2004). 
Animal studies, mainly using monkeys, are revealing new information about how animals 
estimate the value of specific actions. For example, in a series of experiments Shultz looked at 
the neuronal response in the substantia nigra and the ventral tegmental area of the monkey brain 
in order to determine activity when a monkey pressed levers for juice rewards (Schultz 1998; 
Schultz et al. 1997). Another animal study looked at whether specific neuronal activation can be 
correlated to the probability that the animal expects of gain (Platt and Glimcher 1999). 
 How we respond to monetary reward has also been investigated using fMRI. The neural 
substrates of financial reinforcement overlap with areas that deal with primary reinforcers, such 
as food (Elliott et al. 2003). Gold has made an argument for reward expectation to be linked to 
the basal ganglia (Gold 2003). 
Breiter, et al. have used fMRI to analyze the neural response to expectation and 
experience of gains and loss (Breiter et al. 2001). The study found that that there may be a 
common circuitry of neurons that process different types of rewards. In studies conducted with 
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monkeys, it was found that the rhinal cortex was important for creating the associations between 
visual stimuli and their motivational significance (Liu et al. 2000; Liu and Richmond 2000). 
Monkeys whose rhinal cortex had been removed were not able to adjust their motivation to 
changes in a reward schedule, while unaffected monkeys were able to adjust their motivation. 
The complexity of how motivation works to cause action is not clearly understood, but it is 
believed that a limbic-striatal-pallidal circuit forms the basis for the translation of motivation into 
action (Liu et al. 2000). 
Closely related to the question of reward is addiction. Neural activity drives the search 
for food in both animals and humans. These same neuronal networks may also drive behavior to 
seek other kinds of substances that rate high on the reward evaluation. When the brain is strongly 
activated by, for example, sugar, food or drugs, it can lead to abuse which is often called 
addiction (Hoebel et al. 1999). 
 The neural substrate association with time discounting was investigated using fMRI, and 
it was found that human subjects use different regions in the brain to calculate short and long 
term monetary rewards (McClure et al. 2004a). The limbic system associated with the midbrain 
dopamine system tended to be activated when decisions which would bring immediate 
gratification were contemplated. On the other hand, the lateral prefrontal cortex and posterior 
parietal cortex was activated by intertemporal choices regardless of whether the delay was short 
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 A critical issue in behavioral decision theory is why people and animals would choose to 
engage in behavior that is detrimental or harmful. This issue is related to the question of 
addictive behavior and the endeavor to understand the neural underpinnings of reinforcement and 
inhibition of behavior. In an early neuroeconomic paper dealing with this issue, Bernheim and 
Rangel (2002) proposed a mathematical theory of addiction that sought to explain irrational 
addictive behavior in terms of decision theory and economics (Bernheim and Rangel 2002a; 
Bernheim and Rangel 2002b). The model is based on the idea that cognitive processes like 
attention can affect behavioral outcomes regardless of initial preference. If a person is subject to 
“hot cognition” (or affect laden thinking), for example, he/she may engage in consumption 
behavior that conflicts with preference because the focus is on usage and “the high” (Bernheim 
and Rangel 2002a). 
 The theory of cue reactivity is another theory that might serve to explain why addiction 
levels remain high even though subjects self report that they are striving to quit and they do not 
enjoy the consumption of their addictive substance (Carter and Tiffany 1999; Laibson 2001). In a 
recent study that used fMRI to analyze neural response in adolescents to alcohol related imagery, 
researchers found that adolescents with even a short usage history of alcohol had significantly 
higher blood oxygen response in areas of the brain associated with reward, desire, positive affect 
and episodic recall (Tapert et al. 2003). 
There are various types of addictive behaviors that are under investigation by researchers. 
A type of consumption addiction involves the dispensation of products. The neural basis of 
collecting and hoarding in humans was analyzed using patients with prefrontal cortex lesions 
(Anderson et al. 2005). In addition to judgments of use and consequences of discarding 
possessions, other cognitive processing going on at the time of the decision to save may be 
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important. Compulsive hoarders appear to have a peculiar perspective with regard to possessions. 
When deciding whether or not to discard a possession, they spend most of their time thinking 
about being without the possession (the cost of discarding) and little time thinking about the cost 
of saving it, or the benefit of not having it. This notion is similar to an observation made by 
Smith (1990) about animal hoarding. Smith (1990) speculated that the sight of a nut (by a 
squirrel) puts the squirrel 'in touch with' the feeling of being hungry and without the nut. For the 
hoarder, the sight of the possession puts them 'in touch with' the feeling of being without the 
possession and needing it. This feeling dominates their consideration of whether the possession 
should be discarded (Frost and Hartl 1996). 
 There are many other types of addictive behavior being investigated using theories 
developed from neuroscientific techniques, with relevance for neuroeconomics and behavioral 
decision theory. Examples include pathological gambling, substance abuse including nicotine, 
heroin, cocaine, alcohol, shopping, credit card use, and internet use (Carter and Tiffany 1999; 
Chambers et al. 2003; Due et al. 2002; Margolin and Kelly 1992; Potenza et al. 2003; Robinson 
and Berridge 1993; Spinella et al. 2004; Warren and McDonough 1999; Wilson et al. 2004). 
 
Risk Judgment and Choice 
 Aversion to risk is linked to the amygdala and is driven by the ancient fear response 
(Camerer et al. 2004). Cortical override of the fear response is demonstrated in animal studies 
using shock. Over time, the response will be “extinguished.” If the connections between the 
amygdala and the cortex are severed, the fear response will return. This demonstrates that the 
amygdala does not “forget” but the cortex is suppressing the response. 
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Risky choice is different from risk judgment in that the subject must choose between 
risky gambles which force an interaction between cognition and affect. Patients with damage to 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex seem to suffer from decision-making deficits. In a study 
which measured performance in gambling tasks, these patients continued to choose 
disadvantageously even after they knew the correct strategy (Bechara et al. 1997). Normal 
subjects used the advantageous strategy even before they consciously realized which strategy 
worked best. Additionally, normal subjects developed skin conductance responses (SCR) when 
facing a risky choice even before they knew that the choice was actually risky. For the patients 
with prefrontal damage, these SCRs never developed. This suggests that there might be a 
nonconscious, autonomic bias that guides risky decision-making that is based in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, responding even before conscious cognition is aware of the risk. 
Bechara, et al. hypothesize that this covert bias activation is dependent on past reward and loss 
experiences and the emotions that go with them, with damage to the ventromedial cortex 
interfering with access to this knowledge.  
A recent study looked at how emotion affects perceptions of risk in investment behavior 
(Shiv et al. 2005). Using patients with stable focal lesions in the brain regions associated with 
emotion, Shiv, et al. compared investment decisions over 20 rounds to those made by patients 
with lesions in areas unrelated to emotion (control) and normal subjects. They hypothesized that 
the patients with damage to the emotional regions would be able to make better investment 
decisions since they would not be subject to emotional reactions that could lead to poor choices. 
This hypothesis was based on the case of a patient with ventromedial prefrontal damage who was 
able to avoid an accident on an icy road while others skidded out of control. The patient revealed 
later that because he felt a lack of fear, he was able to calmly react to the road conditions by 
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thinking rationally about the appropriate driving response (Damasio 1994). This led the 
researchers to wonder whether a lack of normal emotional reactions might allow people to make 
more advantageous decisions. The study found that normal participants and control patients 
became more conservative in the investment strategy after a win or loss, whereas the lesion 
patients made more advantageous decisions and ultimately earned more money from their 
investment decisions (Shiv et al. 2005). Other studies have found that even low levels of 
negative emotions can result in loss of self control which can have less than optimal outcomes 
for the subjects. For example, as the result of myopic loss aversion people exhibit high levels of 
loss aversion when gambles are presented one at a time rather than all at once (Benartzi and 
Thaler 1995). 
 
The Neural Foundations of Preferences 
One of the most interesting papers with specific implications for marketing research is a 
twist on the Coke and Pepsi taste test done by neuroscientists at Baylor (McClure et al. 2004b). 
This study looks at the effect of brand cues over behavioral preference, finding that what 
consumers say they prefer in terms of taste is not what the brain reveals is their preference. Even 
more specifically, it seems that cultural cues such as brand, which are a top down process, may 
have a significant biasing effect on bottom up preferences such as taste, and that people do not 
make choices based solely on sensory stimuli processing systems such as gustation, olfaction, 
visual, etc. This study looks at whether consumers look at immediate gratification differently 
from delayed rewards (McClure et al. 2004a). 
Kahneman (1994) outlined four types of utilities that influence utility: remembered 
utility, anticipated utility, choice utility and experienced utility. Camerer discusses that these 
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different types of utilities often contradict and conflict with each other (Camerer et al. 2003).This 
may signify that there are different brain areas that calculate these utilities independently and 
then compete for dominance. In fact, Berridge and Robinson (1998) found that there are distinct 
neural regions for wanting and liking which is analogous to choice utility and experienced utility. 
A good example of this is the conflict that addicts feel between craving or wanting and 





It is not necessarily a new concept that brain science offers insights into economic and 
behavioral phenomena. While not universally embraced by all economists, some behavioral 
economists have been using constructs from psychology in order to attempt to build more 
descriptive and realistic models of behavior (Huang 2005). However, for the first time, imaging 
technology such as fMRI offers the type of tools that can effectively explore the subtleties of the 
human brain while being noninvasive, relatively safe for human subjects and providing results 
that are robust and revealing. However, fMRI studies have been questioned by critics because of 
the use of small sample sizes (typically less than 40 subjects), the ambiguity in human 
neuroanatomy mapping, lagtime of the hemodynamic response, image distortion due to signal 
dropoff, motion artifacts, and susceptibility, poor temporal resolution and the debate over 
functional definitions of neural areas (Savoy 1998; Savoy 1999; Wald 2005). Despite the 
limitations and difficulties in analyzing the results produced by fMRI, significant improvements 
in brain mapping, imaging power and resolution (there are now 3T, 4T and 7T scanners being 
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used to gain improved imaging resolution) have indicated that at least some of these shortcoming 
may be reduced with the next generation of equipment. 
 
Implications for Marketing 
 An example of how neuroeconomics could be applied to an important marketing research 
area deals with the question of consumption addiction. This is especially true in developing 
effective marketing communications for vulnerable consumers such as children and adolescents. 
Pechmann et al. (2006) presented evidence from the addiction and neuroscience literature that 
adolescents were more vulnerable to advertising and promotions due to the unique structure of 
their neural development (Pechmann et al. 2005). This may indicate that the decision-making 
process for adolescents is significantly different from that of children and adults. While there has 
been evidence from empirical social psychology studies to support this assertion, increasing 
definitive evidence based on neuroimaging studies has been developed by researchers from 
psychology, neuroscience, and medicine. This important development could offer a strong basis 
for marketing research that seeks to investigate how and why adolescents respond to marketing 
communications and advertising differently. Furthermore, marketing research could begin to 
develop ways to protect vulnerable adolescents from detrimental product categories such as 
cigarettes and alcohol, while enhancing the relevance and efficacy of marketing that is crucial to 
adolescents such as health messages. In this way, neuroeconomics methods can offer marketing 
researchers a valuable suite of methods that will allow a more refined and revealing 
understanding of the neural basis of consumer choice for a developmentally unique segment of 
the population, adolescents. 
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Managerial Implications 
 This paper shows the diverse questions that can be addressed using neuroeconomic 
techniques and methods. How consumers make decisions is important for marketers in 
developing consumer and financial products. Thus, the application of neuroeconomics to 
important marketing issues can be of vital importance to marketers. However, marketers must be 
sensitive to the public concern that many neuroscientific techniques may be considered invasive 
and ill applied to many of the marketing concerns of marketers especially when they are used as 
a means of selling more product to a consumer society. For that reason, this paper suggests that 
the best application of neuroeconomic principles may be for marketing issues that are related to 
important public policy issues such as consumption addiction, protection of vulnerable 
consumers and aiding consumers to make better decisions (Petty and Cacioppo 1996). 
Nonetheless, neuroeconomics could serve as an important new area for tackling many of the 
fundamental questions about consumer decision-making that have been difficult to explain 
theoretically.  
 
Controversy Related to “Neuromarketing” 
 Using tools developed in neuroscience to look into consumer preferences has been called 
“neuromarketing” by some, although this term is still not universally used. The popular press has 
run a number of articles on the subject of neuroeconomics and neuromarketing (Begley 2002; 
Blakeslee 2003; Blakeslee 2004; D'Antonio 2004; Hotz 2005; Marketing Week 2005; The 
Economist 2004). In addition, some corporate marketing departments have set up their own 
neuroscience labs in order to test consumer response to product designs, marketing stimuli, etc. 
Specialized marketing consultants have also used theories developed in neuroscience studies to 
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create tools that attempt to reveal preferences, choices and responses to specific products and 
campaign ideas.  
Some have voiced a concern that neuroscience may reveal too much about the brain to 
those who would seek to use that information to their advantage. In particular, some consumer 
advocacy groups such as Commercial Alert have lobbied Congress and other federal institutions 
in order to attempt to stop activities that are deemed to be neuromarketing in nature (Commerical 
Alert 2004). The major concern is that the everyday person could be made vulnerable to 
mechanisms of persuasion that neuroscience reveals.  
However, there is an opportunity to use the insights gleaned through neuroscientific 
techniques to enhance the consumer experience. A better understanding of the effect of 
environmental cues on addictive behavior could protect vulnerable populations, such as 
adolescents and children, from exposure to detrimental marketing influences. In addition, a better 
understanding of the decision-making and preference process of consumers could allow for the 
creation of better decision-making tools for consumers in addition to helping firms to tailor their 
marketing strategies to aid consumer decision-making. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Neuroeconomics offers the potential for insights into the neurological processes that 
underlie human and animal behavior. Using experimental methodologies combined with imaging 
and other neuroscience tools can better help us understand the mechanisms of decision-making, 
choice, preference, risk seeking or avoidance, valuation, bias, weighting, conflict, gain and loss. 
While neuroeconomics as a field of study is in a relatively early phase, there are a growing 
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number of researchers who are establishing new theoretical constructs that could potentially 
inform economics, behavioral decision theory, management, marketing, and psychology. 
Within neuroeconomics, there are a number of intriguing areas of research that have not 
yet been fully explored and could prove of further interest. Such future areas of research might 
include: 
- How do neural systems work together to create decision-making behavior? 
- How wide is the variation in brain patterns between different population groups? 
o subgroups (age, race, gender, individual variation) 
o vulnerable populations 
- How do cultural differences between population groups demonstrate differential 
neural response to experiments in judgment, choice, conflict, risk, etc. 
- How does free will play into neural responses to decision-making variables? 
- What factors influence the development of addictive behavior and what factors could 
act to discontinue these addictions? 
While the application of neuroscientific methods to economics and other related fields may cause 
continuing controversy and debate among scientists and the public, the results gleaned thus far 
from neuroeconomic research have revealed valuable insights into the neural substrates that 
affect human and animal decision-making. It seems reasonable to think that these insights may 
allow for new, more revealing models of decision-making that will take into account the 
underlying neurological mechanisms that drive behavior, emotion and choice. 
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Table 1 
Methodology What Is Imaged  How 
Electroencephalography (EEG) Changes in electrical brain 
current 
Electrodes are placed on 
scalp to measure electrical 
brain waves coming from 
the brain 
Computerized Tomography 
(CT or CAT) 
X-ray images of brain 
structures 
Multiple images  
(tomograms) of the brain 
are taken by rotating X-ray 
tube 
Positron Emission Tomography 
(PET) 
Emissions from radioactive 
chemicals in blood  
Radioactive isotopes 
injected into blood stream 
are detected like X rays 
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) 
Changes in electrical brain 
current 
Magnet creates strong 
magnetic field to which 
molecules align, radio 




Changes in electrical brain 
current 
Similar to EEG but instead 
magnetic fields are 
measures instead of electric 
fields 
Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) 
Blood flow, specifically 
oxyhemoglobin to 
deoxyhemoglobin ratio 
Relies on magnetic 
properties of blood to map 
blood flow; show brain 
function 
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Figure 1 










At node A, player 1 has the option of either path. Moving left ends the game with the outcomes: 
top goes to player 1 and bottom to player 2. Moving right allows player 2 to move. Player 2 can 
choose either path at node B. Once player 2 moves the game ends and payoffs are distributed 
(McCabe 2003a).  
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Appendix A: Four Lobes of the Cerebral Cortex  
Figure A-1  
 
 




Frontal Lobe: Planning and production of body and eye movements, speech, cognition, 
emotions, organizing behavior, thoughts and memories 
Parietal Lobe: Mediates perceptions of touch, pain and limb position, integrates sensory 
information for perception and language, mathematical thought and visuospatial cognition 
Occipital Lobe: Location of the primary visual cortex 
Temporal Lobe: Mediates sensory function and participates in memory and emotions; location 
of the primary auditory cortex (Martin 2003) 
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Amygdala: Lies in front of hippocampus in the anterior pole of the temporal lobe and is 
important in the control of emotional behavior. 
Cerebellum: Prominent hindbrain structure that governs motor coordination, posture and 
balance.  
Cingulate Gyrus: Lies just superior to corpus callosum and forms part of the limbic system; 
important in emotional functions. 
Corpus Callosum: Large midline fiber structure that contains axons that connect the cortex on 
the two sides of the brain. 
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Hippocampal Formation: A cortical structure in the temporal lobe; important to a variety of 
functions including short term declarative memory. 
Hypothalamus: Part of the diencephalon which integrates functions from the autonomic nervous 
system and controls endocrine hormone release of the pituitary gland; governs reproductive, 
homeostatic and circadian functions. 
Insular Cortex (not shown): Part of the cerebral cortex found in the depths of the lateral fissure; 
important in taste, internal body senses and some aspects of pain. 
Pons: Component of the brain stem which plays key role in eye movement 
Spinal Cord: Portion of the central nervous system that extends from the lower end of the 
brainstem. 
Striatum: Made up of the caudate and putamen and is part of the basal ganglia; involved in 
planning and modulation of movement but also involved in other cognitive processes including 
executive function and processing of reward, aversion, novel or unexpected stimuli. 
Thalamus: A part of the diencephalons which is a key structure for transmitting sensory 
information to the cerebral hemispheres from the lower centers. (Martin 2003; Purves et al. 
1997) 
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